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Introduction
A common claim is that hyperbolic discounting provides a better answer than exponential discounting to the questions of why people borrow so much and why they wait so long to save for retirement. For instance, Weinberg (2000, 2001) and Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2007) conclude that hyperbolic discounting provides a better explanation of the aggressive borrowing observed in the data, regardless of whether individuals are naive or sophisticated. And O' Donoghue and Rabin (1999) conclude that hyperbolic discounting (with naiveté) better accounts for delayed implementation of retirement saving plans.
Our paper reaches a di¤erent set of conclusions. While past studies abstract from the choice of when to retire, we show that if …nancial planning is enriched to include this margin, then naive hyperbolic discounters may borrow far less and start saving for retirement significantly earlier than exponential discounters. This is true even though hyperbolic discounters fall short of their saving goals.
To show this we extend Diamond and K½ oszegi's (2003) endogenous retirement model in two ways: …rst, we use continuous time rather than three periods to capture richer saving dynamics; and second, we study naiveté rather than sophistication which means the individual constantly revises all dimensions of his …nancial plans. Not only does the individual fail to follow through with past consumption and saving plans, but he also makes and then breaks his plans about his future retirement age. In our preferred parameterization, hyperbolic discounters incur about half as much debt and start saving several years earlier during the working phase than exponential discounters. Moreover, assets at retirement are roughly equivalent.
These counter-conventional …ndings come from the interplay between the dual layers of time inconsistency. While they are young, hyperbolic discounters make plans to retire early but then fail to save as much as they had planned. They respond by delaying their future retirement age. Actual retirement occurs when it is no longer desirable to postpone retirement. In our baseline calibration, hyperbolic discounters initially plan to retire at age 61 but then they delay until ultimately retiring at age 66. In contrast, exponential discounters correctly anticipate their retirement age which we calibrate to 66 to make a fair comparison. Even though hyperbolic discounters fall short of their saving goals, they borrow relatively little and save relatively early because their decisions are based on mistaken beliefs about early retirement. Therefore, almost paradoxically, time-inconsistent preferences can produce "provident"savings outcomes.
Our …ndings may be particularly surprising given that one may have expected naive individuals to retire earlier than planned as they succumb to self-control problems. In fact, naive individuals will indeed retire earlier than planned if they are arti…cially endowed at each point in time with "commitment assets" (assets corresponding to the …rst plan). But in a richer model with dual layers of time inconsistency where the individual falls short of past saving goals, the temptation to retire early is dominated by the desire to postpone retirement in order to buy extra time to earn and save.
Our …ndings may have practical implications. It has become fashionable to justify government intervention in household …nancial planning by pointing to time-inconsistent preferences (i.e., to a failure to reach past saving goals). However, past saving goals may be based on mistaken beliefs about the age of retirement. If so, then there is no obvious argument for helping people to reach their past goals. Moreover, the argument for intervention is further weakened if individuals with time-inconsistent preferences get out of debt quicker, start saving earlier, and accumulate roughly the same assets for retirement as otherwise identical individuals with standard preferences.
2 Continuous-Time Model with Naiveté
Notation
We abstract to a stylized setting. Age is continuous and indexed by t. The individual starts work at t = 0, retires endogenously at t = T , and passes away at t = T . He discounts future utility with the function F (x) for a delay of length x, where F (0) = 1 and dF (x)=dx < 0. Consumption is c(t) and holdings of a zero-interest asset are k(t). The asset can be positive (savings) or negative (debt). We assume k(0) = k( T ) = 0. The style of our labor market follows Diamond and K½ oszegi (2003) , Heijdra and Romp (2009) , and Dybvig and Liu (2010) : everyone starts out a worker, labor is indivisible during the working years, and retirement is irreversible. The period utility function when working is ln c(t)
where > 0, and ln c(t) when retired. We have worked out numerous, more complicated versions of our model with additional features such as part-time work after retirement, social security taxes and bene…ts, positive returns on savings, and CRRA utility. But these additional features do not alter our conclusions, so we present this stylized version that has an analytical solution.
Formally,
We denote planned quantities with a hat (^) and actual quantities with an asterisk ( ).
Financial Planning
At any t before retirement, the individual makes a …nancial plan involving consumption and saving allocations and an intended age of retirement,
subject to
with k(t) = k (t) and k( T ) = 0.
The solution, as a function of k (t), from the perspective of any planning instant t, iŝ
A(t)
The Path Actually Followed
The naive individual believes that his future selves will adhere to the plan denoted above, yet his actual consumption coincides with his planned consumption only at the instant the plan is formulated. Actual consumption at time t is found by replacing v in (4) with t,
Equation (7) is the envelope of initial values from in…nitely many planned consumption paths. Finally, actual retirement T solves the implicit function
Closed-Form Solution
Let F (x) = (1 + x) 1 . At any age t during the working period, the intended age of retirementT (t) and the actual consumption and savings paths c (t) and k (t) arê
c (t) = Z(t)
See the Appendix for the derivation.
3 Numerical Examples and Discussion
Hyperbolic Discounting
An individual starts work at age 25 and passes away at 80, hence T = 55. We set = 3%, though our results are robust to larger values of . We calibrate = 1:872 to generate actual retirement at age 66. Figure 1 depictsT (t), the timepath for the intended age of retirement. The individual works if the planned retirement age exceeds his current age. The individual actually retires when the planned age of retirement is equal to his current age. In particular, the individual ultimately delays retirement by 4.8 years.
We plot two worklife consumption pro…les in Figure 2 to highlight the implications of time inconsistency in retirement choice. The pro…les correspond to hyperbolic discounting with and without endogenous retirement. We set retirement to 66 in the version with exogenous retirement to conduct a fair comparison with equal lifetime earnings. Clearly, intentions about the future age of retirement exert signi…cant slope and level e¤ects on consumption.
The di¤erences in worklife consumption become more pronounced with larger values of . For example, 66 remains the age of actual retirement for = 6% as long as is calibrated to 2.3015. Figure 3 demonstrates that the degree of time inconsistency in planned retirement becomes more severe relative to the baseline. Figure 4 plots the bias in consumption that arises when retirement is exogenously imposed, de…ned as the ratio of consumption with exogenous retirement to consumption with endogenous retirement. Consumption can be overstated by as much as 40% when young and understated by as much as 20% when older if retirement choice is ignored.
Hyperbolic versus Exponential Discounting
To understand the consequences of preference reversals induced by hyperbolic discounting, it is logical to compare to a model without such reversals (i.e., exponential discounting, F (x) = e x ). We select the parameters of the alternative discount functions so that actual retirement occurs at the same age. This allows us to ask the following question: given an actual retirement age, what do the alternative discount functions predict about debt and savings before that age? If parameters are selected any other way such that the age of actual retirement is di¤erent across discount functions, then any comparison of savings outcomes is contaminated by di¤erences in total lifetime earnings. Given = 1:872, retirement under exponential discounting occurs at 66 if = 2:072%. Figure 5 illustrates our main …ndings. Relative to exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting leads to approximately half as much borrowing during the early years of the worklife, earlier saving for retirement by several years, and approximately the same balance in the savings asset at retirement. This is surprising since the hyperbolic discounter persistently fails to follow his saving plans while the exponential discounter never deviates from his plan.
Time inconsistency in retirement choice is responsible for these outcomes. Even though the actual age of retirement is identical, the hyperbolic discounter intends to be retired earlier than the exponential discounter. Early saving and restrained borrowing follow naturally since an earlier intended age of retirement requires an aggressive saving plan to …nance in ‡ated retirement needs. Figure 6 is analogous to Figure 5 , but it includes the asset path of an otherwise identical hyperbolic discounter who retires exogenously at 66. Notice that the hyperbolic discounter borrows more than the exponential discounter and also starts saving later for retirement in the absence of retirement choice. This exercise lines up with conventional wisdom, yet it reinforces our central message.
Our …ndings are robust if the model is re-calibrated to alternative ages of actual retirement (e.g., ages 63, 69, 72). Hyperbolic discounting with endogenous retirement consistently leads to less borrowing, earlier saving, and similar resources at retirement, relative to exponential discounting. This robustness analysis is reported in Tables 1a and 1b . We have not identi…ed any calibration that reverses our …ndings while making reasonable predictions about the age of actual retirement.
Finally, there exists a non-trivial bias against our …ndings given that the exponential discounter is more patient than the hyperbolic discounter for every ( ; ) pair that we consider. By this we mean that the area under the exponential discount function is strictly larger than the area under the hyperbolic function for all t. The area under a discount function, A(t) from (6), is a measure of the overall level of patience (e.g., Myerson, Green, and Warusawitharana 2001; Caliendo and Findley 2014) . Therefore, in our numerical exercises the hyperbolic discounter is strictly more impatient than the exponential discounter from every vantage point. Yet despite this bias, the hyperbolic discounter borrows less, starts saving earlier, and arrives at retirement with nearly the same level of savings.
Appendix: Derivation of Closed-From Solution
From (5) we de…ne the value function from the perspective of any pre-retirement vantage point t as
Using the hyperbolic discount function F (x) = (1 + x) 1 , di¤erentiate (13) with respect to T to obtain a unique stationary point
Next insert (14) into (7) and use the de…nition of Z(t)
Insert (15) into the top equation in (1)
and solve (16) using the boundary condition k (0) = 0 to obtain the actual savings account balance (11) during the working period. Equations (9) and (10) follow by inserting (11) into (14) and (15). Finally, we prove next that the stationary pointT (t) does indeed correspond to a maximum and not a minimum. To illustrate, we break into two cases. Case 1 is any point in time for which k (t) 0. Case 2 is the reverse, k (t) > 0. Case 1. The value function V (T ) is de…ned only for T > t k (t) t 0 . For an arbitrary small positive scalar ;
Making arbitrarily small makes dV (t 0 + )=dT arbitrarily large and positive. Hence, the value function is increasing in T at the point T = t 0 + , and since the …rst-order condition dV (T )=dT = 0 has only one root (T (t)), it must correspond to a local maximum rather than a minimum. Case 2. Note that,
if at time t, k (t) < A(t) , then dV (t) dT > 0 andT (t) > t is a local max. Note: We use ψ = 1.872, β = 0.03, and ρ = 0.02072.
